Since that time, however, the federal Since that time, however, the federal government has refused to allow anyone to transport J.D.
Once they enter this stage, kids start to think more logically, but may still struggle with hypothetical situations and abstract thinking. Because they are beginning to see things from another person's perspective, now is a good time to start teaching empathy. Formal operational stage: From age 12 and up, kids are in the formal operational stage. Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) offers a pragmatic reason for believing in God: even under the assumption that God’s existence is unlikely, the potential benefits of believing are so vast as to make betting on theism rational. Feldman’s Reason and Argument Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow Vaughn’s The Power of Critical Thinking Nelson Landes Classical Logic and its Rabbit Holes On Philosophy: Dolores Morris’ Believing Philosophy: A Guide to Becoming a Christian Philosopher The super-dominance form of the argument conveys the basic Pascalian idea, the expectations argument refines it, and the dominating expectations. Sensorimotor stage: This stage takes place from birth to age 2 and involves learning about the environment through movements and sensations.
Broadly speaking, the current consensus about the basic distinction is similar to that theme of this chapter. They also develop an ability to use deductive reasoning and understand abstract ideas. As they become more adept at problem-solving, they also are able to think more scientifically about the world around them. During this stage, children learn to think symbolically as well as use words or pictures to represent things. Kids in this stage enjoy pretend play but still struggle with logic and understanding another person's perspective.
I would agree now, as I did then, that the distinction between argument and explanation is not an exclusive one. Looking back at the chapter many years later, I still find myself impressed by the examples he put forward. Thomas, who maintained on the basis of a number of tricky cases that the argument/explanation distinction did not hold up to scrutiny. Reasoning is used in both, and the same indicator words are used in both.This chapter represents my response to a challenge issued by S.N.
Explaining, one presumes general agreement about C arguing one presumes the actuality or possibility of disagreement about C. Arguing, one will cite reasons or evidence purporting to show that C is true. Explaining, one will offer an account (usually causal) as to why or how C came to be true. The ‘why?’ of explanation differs from the ‘why?’ of argument. Yet it is still the case that argument and explanation differ from a pragmatic point of view.
One can ask just who it is that is referred to as accepting or disputing claim C. Mayes put it this way: in an argument, the conclusion is disputed in an explanation, the conclusion (or statement that would stand in the place occupied by the conclusion) is already accepted. In other words, I preserved the binary but allowed that it was not exclusive.In a 2010 article, ”Argument Explanation Complementarity and the Structure of Informal Reasoning” Gregory Randolph Mayes similarly maintained a distinction between argument and explanation. Working through some of his challenging examples, I agreed that a passage could constitute both argument and explanation but resisted renouncing the distinction altogether on that account. Still more significantly, he found cases that qualified both as argument and as explanation and thus undermined the dichotomy.
Mayes is aware of such issues nevertheless he sustains his view that the arguer’s states of acceptance or doubt determine the argument or explanation status of her discourse.Mayes offers lucid and interesting examples of how argument and explanation may be combined in discourse. The audience could be lured into supposing that C is true, or it could expect an argument and be disappointed that what the arguer has to offer will not provide justifying evidence or reasons. If she is mistaken about that, the explanation will not be appropriate. For example she might suppose that the persons she is addressing grant that C and offer to them an explanation of C. The arguer can of course get the matter wrong.
(I had noted a third alternative — descriptive discourse that is neither justificatory nor explanatory – in my textbook.) Dufour maintained that one does not always find disagreement about the conclusion of an argument. The author, Michel Dufour , points out that neither Thomas nor myself questioned the exhaustiveness of the argument/explanation binary. As he says, argument and explanation can be complementary to each other in these sorts of cases.A 2017 article “Argument or Explanation: Who is to Decide?” appeared just as I was about to write this introduction.
Those which precede the conclusions in arguments may equally well precede what is explained in an explanation. Nevertheless, there are a number of interesting and relatively unexplored issues about the relation, similarities, and distinction between argument and explanation.The so-called logical indicator words – ‘thus’, ‘therefore’, ‘since’, ‘because’, ‘so’, and many others, are as common in explanations as they are in arguments. Most introductory accounts of argument take this contrast for granted. In explanations, statements are made in an attempt to account for, or show the cause of, a state of affairs.
2 Although this account is now widely criticized, it was dominant in the philosophy of science for several decades and still enjoys influence. Thus she lost a lot of weight over the summer.Here the fact explained is preceded by ‘thus.’ l Similarly, words like ‘because’, ‘since’, and ‘for’, which are used to introduce premises in arguments, are also often used to introduce explaining statements in explanations.According to the classic deductive-nomological account, explanation is one type of argument. But in other cases, ‘thus’ functions just as naturally in an explanation, as in:She ate about the same amount as usual but got much more exercise, running after the children and doing all the housework and gardening. Thus, such proceedings should be recorded and public access to the records should be allowed.In this example, ‘thus’ is used in its paradigmatic logical role, preceding the conclusion in an argument. Public accountability is essential.
3This influential discussion of the relation between explanation and argument appears impoverished if examined from the perspective of a richer and more sensitive theory of argument. Nor does there seem to have been any attempt to explore more sophisticated cumulative argument structures as models for elaborate explanations. (Most A’s are B’s this is an A therefore this is most likely a B.) Although other types of arguments, such as analogies and conductive arguments, might have been explored for their potential as models for other types of scientific explanation, they were not. The relation between argument and scientific explanation has been studied largely in the context of the issue of whether scientific explanations can or should be made to fit this standard pattern or a statistical variation of it. In the influential covering law model of scientific explanation, scientific explanations are seen as having this form (at least implicitly), so that every complete scientific explanation is at the same time a deductively valid argument. An especially clear and intellectually important type is the subsuming deduction: ‘All As are Bs this is an A therefore this is a B’.
Students find the distinction hard to grasp in theory and difficult to apply in practice. Instructors often find it difficult to teach students the distinction between explanation and argument. The enduring influence of this model provides one incentive to reexamine that textbook contrast between argument and explanation.Another incentive arises from pedagogical experience. The philosophical studies of scientific explanation and its relation to argument could profitably be broadened by greater reference to explanation outside science as well as to nondeductive and cumulative patterns of argument.The fact remains, however, that many serious and prominent thinkers retain the view that scientific explanations constitute a type of deductively valid argument. Furthermore, scientific explanations are not the only explanations.
People may become unaccustomed to rational argument and find it hard to appreciate any contrast between requests to explain why one thinks as one does and requests, on the other hand, to provide rational support for one’s claims.Even when the distinction between explanation and argument is grasped in theory, many passages, real or invented, can be interpreted as either explanation or argument. Such crucial terms as ‘why’, ‘reasons’, and ‘because’ fit naturally into both explanations and arguments. Issues of justifiability may disappear.
Thomas:Managers who at an early stage showed much promise, career growth, and mobility may find themselves classified as nonpromotable for any of a dozen reasons … Once labeled nonpromotable , a person is frequently put on a shelf and only tolerated within an organization.
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